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RECONSTRUCTING SIERRA LEONE 
 
 
 
BRUCE BAKER and ROY MAY 
 
 
 
 
Sierra Leone’s 10-year civil conflict ended in 2001 and was followed by a 
substantial reconstruction project. This paper considers how far that 
programme addresses the underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to 
internal conflict and to what degree signs of genuine reconciliation are 
emerging. To do so three indicators of reconstruction are examined, namely 
youth alienation, state corruption and national reconciliation. The article 
concludes that though there has been successful demobilisation, disarmament 
and infrastructure building, factors that contributed to the conflict have not 
been tackled and the signs of reconciliation are still slight.  Such a foundation 
is not sufficient to rebuild the nation or to guarantee its future security.  
 
 
As Sierra Leone’s 10-year conflict ground to a halt in late 2001 (it was formally 
declared over in January 2002), its five and a half million population, more than a 
third of whom were displaced or made refugees, were left with the enormous task of 
reconstructing their individual and collective lives. Many were faced with the multiple 
challenges of having to rebuild their homes and their livelihoods. In addition, some 
had to re-establish their relationships with villages that they had fled or with the 
neighbours and settlers that had engaged in atrocities. Inevitably they questioned 
whether their lives and country could ever be rebuilt. Likewise donors and aid 
agencies pondered what would be required to reconstruct the nation, particularly as 
their first efforts had come to a dramatic halt with a reversion to civil war in 2000. 
This paper, based on research in March 2003, considers the nature of some of the 
problems facing the country and how far the external aid programme addresses the 
underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to internal conflict and is succeeding in 
promoting a level of peace on which to rebuild social and economic life. 
 
 
THE WAR-TORN CONDITION JANUARY 2003 
 
No one can imagine the degree of trauma that many still suffer, having experienced or 
witnessed killings, rape and mutilation and having been forced into being combatants, 
perpetrators of violence and sex slaves.1 By every measure of human well-being large 
numbers were impoverished – whether that was calculated in terms of the availability 
of security, shelter, employment and access to health, education, sanitation and 
potable water. There were 500,000 living outside the country and hundreds of 
thousands had been internally displaced, more than 215,000 women and girls had 
been subjected to sexual violence2 and 72,000 ex-combatants needed reinsertion into 
civilian life. 300 towns and villages and 340,000 houses had been destroyed, whilst 80 
per cent of health posts needed rehabilitation or reconstruction. 50 percent of teachers 
on the payroll were absent from their posts. 85 per cent of livestock had been lost.  
The country had the lowest Human Development Index in the world. The fighting was 
over, the devastation was not. 
    At the level of their communal organisation there was the task of resurrecting the 
traditional and state political structures. Government services had collapsed at the 
local level with the loss of personnel and infrastructure. Government employees and 
paramount chiefs had been forced to abandoned their posts, whilst most of the police 
stations, police barracks, prisons, courts, chiefdom lock-ups, hospitals, clinics and 
schools had been severely damaged. Yet the people did not want to simply rebuild the 
infrastructure and return to the pre-war condition, for that was associated with 
injustice, corruption and authoritarianism. Rather, they saw the end of the conflict as 
an opportunity for Sierra Leone to reconstruct society after 30 years of social injustice 
and the abuse of rule.  
     
 
THE HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAMME 
 
The scale of the crisis evinced a massive humanitarian and reconstruction programme, 
led by United Nations’ agencies such as UNHCR (The Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees) and UNDP (United Nations Development 
Programme), along with the largest ever UN peace mission, UNAMSIL (United 
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, due to depart by December 2004). There were at 
least 60 aid agencies and NGOs, with the UK aid agency DFID (Department for 
International Development) particularly prominent. The sum of their efforts came to 
be termed the 4Rs, namely, repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction. The challenge of the returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
was not just to take them back to the communities of their choice as districts were 
secured by UNAMSIL and government troops, but to reintegrate them into those 
communities. This meant ensuring that at least basic services were present, that 
reconciliation was facilitated, that employment skills were imparted and that security 
was maintained. These repatriation and reintegration programmes continue, although 
rehabilitation rose in importance during 2003, with an emphasis on improving the 
basic services and promoting community participation and good governance. The 
progress has been so successful that now reconstruction programmes are emerging 
that will seek to consolidate the basic services and transfer responsibilities to the 
government, prior to the scaling down of the aid programme from its present level.3
    The transition from emergency relief to development is by no means over, but 
many feel that the enormous cost (estimated at $16.4 billion each year for the UN 
agencies and £100 million each year for the British government) has notched up some 
remarkable achievements. All 323,000 IDPs and those who have returned from 
abroad have been resettled and a large number of combatants have been disarmed, 
demobilised and received reintegration packages. Something like 20,000 houses have 
been constructed. Security and government authority has been restored over most of 
the country, although incursions along the border by the Liberian and Guinean armies 
and rebel troops hinder progress in the southeast. District officers and representatives 
of line ministries have been deployed in most districts, and elections for both the 
paramount chiefs and district councils have taken place. The Sierra Leone Police has 
begun reform and training and has enlarged its numbers so that it is now deployed, 
albeit thinly, over most of the country.
   
4 Similarly, JPs and magistrates have been 
appointed and trained to at least offer the semblance of a nationwide justice system. 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has begun its work of investigating those most 
responsible for the war atrocities with a view to prosecuting them.  Hundreds of 
schools and clinics have been rehabilitated, equipped and minimally staffed, whilst 
amputees have had special housing and training programmes provided for them. Free 
elections have been successfully organised for both the national parliament and 
presidency in May 2002 and for the paramount chiefs. A wide degree of freedom of 
expression for the press and human rights groups and opposition parties is allowed. 
Finally, agriculture is re-establishing itself, which is vital in a country where 75 per 
cent of the population are engaged in it. This is an impressive list by any standards.5
    These achievements represent considerable gains in a very short period of time. 
However, it is equally clear that they have been driven largely by external funding 
and expertise, inevitably creating a dependency culture. Certainly many agencies 
themselves fear that the Sierra Leone government has yet to demonstrate a determined 
resolve itself to do what it can in passing legislation and developing policies.
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Inevitably, therefore, there is anxiety that the momentum for development will rapidly 
slow as aid agencies scale down their interventions and that the bubble in the 
economy created by their presence will burst.   
 
THE INDICATORS OF RECONSTRUCTION 
 
How is the success of the whole reconstruction project in Sierra Leone to be 
measured? The argument of this article is that analysis must take place at the level of 
the social and political substructure and that there must be an evaluation of the degree 
to which the underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to internal conflict have or 
have not been tackled and the degree to which relationships are being restored after 
the divisions and violence of the war. To accomplish this evaluation we have taken 
three indicative issues, namely youth alienation, state corruption and reconciliation. 
The first two have been chosen as indicators of the degree to which the factors 
predisposing to internal conflict have been addressed and the last has been chosen as 
an indicator that relationships between victims and perpetrators are being re-
established.   
    International organisations, and non-government organisations have repeatedly 
emphasised youth alienation and state corruption as crucial to reconstruction because 
of their association with the underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to internal 
conflict. Thus Abu Brima of Network Movement for Justice and Development 
(NMJD) says: ‘The war can only really be over when we begin to address some of the 
root causes. These causes include corruption and mismanagement of the economy, 
neglect of rural areas and lack of opportunities for young people’.7 The UNDP’s 
Governance Programme in Sierra Leone claims: ‘It is the task of development to 
prevent the recurrence of war by addressing its causes. Sierra Leoneans affirm that 
two fundamental causes of the war are bad governance and marginalisation of youth. 
Good governance is a fundamental prerequisite for building lasting peace.’8 Whilst 
the Norwegian Refugee Council asserts that: ‘Deep-rooted issues that gave rise to the 
war - a culture of impunity, endemic corruption, weak rule of law, crushing poverty, 
and the inequitable distribution of the country's vast natural resources - remain largely 
unaddressed’.9
    Amongst academics, several explanatory frameworks have been presented for 
understanding the origins, dynamics and rationale behind the conflict beyond youth 
alienation and government corruption. Although Michael Brown believes, ‘the widely 
  
held view that internal conflicts are often triggered by external “contagion” or 
“spillover”’ effects is particularly suspect’, he allows that in the case of the civil war 
in Sierra Leone spillover from the Liberian conflict was the case.10 However, since 
outside forces could only have successfully prosecuted the rebellion if Sierra 
Leoneans had other reasons for joining in the conflict, spillover cannot be regarded as 
the most significant factor. An increasingly favoured explanation of the civil conflict 
has been in terms of economic greed, which in the Sierra Leonean context consists of 
seeking control of the diamond fields.11 Lans Gberie of Partnership Africa Canada has 
presented this view to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, whilst Sierra 
Leone’s ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim Kamara, has said that the conflict was ‘not 
about ideology, tribal or regional differences. It had nothing to do with the so-called 
problem of marginalised youths, or … an uprising by rural poor against the urban 
elite. The root of the conflict was and remained diamonds’.12 Similarly, the former 
finance minister of Sierra Leone
 
, James Jonah, has described the war as simply about 
diamonds. Yet, as David Francis observes, although there is no denying that conflict 
diamonds have fuelled and perpetuated the war,  
that does not make them the primary cause. A more plausible explanation is 
that economic and political exclusion, perceived injustice and fundamental 
grievances are at the heart of conflict … if diamonds were the primary reason 
for the war why did Sierra Leone not degenerate into civil war until 1991, 
even though diamonds were discovered in the 1930s.13
 
  
Others have argued that marginalisation in general is the main cause. Catherine 
Barnes and Tara Polzer speak of the marginalisation of youth, women and those 
outside of Sierra Leone.
    However, it is the attitude of youth that has attracted the most attention in analyses 
of the war. For some this has been portrayed in terms of the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) tapping into Sierra Leonean youth culture in the rural areas. For instance, 
Paul Richards and others speak of young people in the rural areas being denied a 
means of living and the infrastructure of schools and roads that might open up the 
opportunity to acquire the material assets they were made aware of through world 
radio and videos.
14 
15 Richards argues that the RUF was effective in tapping into this 
youth culture and appealing to them, at least in the early stages of the conflict, in 
terms of incentives that were material (‘they offered me a choice of shoes and dresses 
- I have never had decent shoes before’), social (‘education’) and psychological 
(support and identity). An alternative youth focus has considered what is called the 
‘lumpen’ and ‘subaltern’ youth of Freetown, known for their smoking of marijuana, 
petty theft and violence. The argument is that the marginalisation of urban youth and 
the absence of structured outlets for youth politics caused rebellious youths to turn to 
radical, if uncritical, discourses on pan-Africanism and revolution.16 Neither version 
explain why in other societies with unemployed or unemployable youth, such events 
did not take place. In addition, the ‘lumpen’ thesis assumes that youth were the 
victims of a ‘capitalist transformation’, whereas it seems more credible to see their 
marginalisation in terms of state predation, that is the manipulation of the economy by 
the political and economic elite to get more access to resources.17
    Though the focus on youth as a cause of the war has been popular, there are those 
who see it as only one of a broad range of social and political factors that include state 
failure and corruption. McIntyre sees the interplay of bad governance and 
deteriorating economic conditions as the key underlying factors predisposing Sierra 
  
Leone to internal conflict. According to her thesis, youth were attracted to the rebel 
cause not because of their radicalisation, but because of ‘the displacement of 
communities, the collapse of what little remained of education and health services, 
social cohesion and the accompanying poverty and hardship’. The RUF ‘thrived not 
because of a generation predisposed to violence, but because constructive social 
incentives offered to youth were insufficient to guarantee the perpetuation of an 
already failing state built on a society destabilised by a failing economy’. The RUF 
offered them a new system of social incentives, ‘of a negative, destructive variety, an 
answer to that which the state and society failed to provide.’18 Once started, this war 
only further undermined society’s ability to offer youth attractive prospects, leaving 
them with little alternative but to fight or die. As regards corruption, William Reno 
agrees that this was widely resented and no one was impressed by the anti-corruption 
tribunals that President Strasser set up in the early 1990s, since these were careful to 
focus on low-level or exiled officials and to avoid the big players. However, as he 
points out, corruption was not an activity confined to the government. Business, 
political and military figures also diverted profits from the mines and other state 
assets that might have gone to paying for government services.19
    For all the differences of emphasis, the general consensus is that youth alienation 
and government corruption were key underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to 
internal conflict and thus constitute the basis of the choice of them as markers of 
whether those factors have been addressed by the current reconstruction project. The 
third issue dealt with in this article is reconciliation, on the grounds that this is usually 
taken to mark the end of the conflict cycle. There is no universally agreed definition 
of the term as applied to nations, indeed some would argue that it must be locally 
defined.
   
20 In other words, there has to be a locally negotiated reconciliation process 
where the victims, the perpetrators and the community at large negotiate what is the 
degree of guilt, the appropriate recompense and the indicators of change required. 
Since this article is exploring national reconciliation, it prefers to take a broader view 
of the concept, although at this level there are still widely different views of what it 
involves.21
    A more legalistic definition of reconciliation considers establishing the truth of the 
past human rights violations and installing an effective rule of law to protect the 
restored balance. There is no doubt that this touches on important issues, but most 
recognise that the restoration of formal and legal rights that were lost sight of in the 
conflict, does not in and of itself bring accommodation and reintegration at the level 
of individual experience. This is why others prefer to see reconciliation in terms of 
community building. The war in Sierra Leone could only have happened because 
large numbers ceased to recognise any common purpose and mutual interdependence 
between Sierra Leoneans. In this view, only when these elements are established can 
reconciliation be said to be accomplished. An even fuller definition of reconciliation 
would add to the need for mutual respect the need for confession, restoration and 
forgiveness. There is merit when evaluating reconciliation in looking at both the 
formal processes of establishing the rule of law and the protection of human rights at 
 In nations where protagonists in the conflict have been associated with 
social identities based on ethnicity, religion or class, reconciliation could well be 
defined in terms of dissolving any identities that rest on group superiority or 
alternatively could be defined in terms of mutual co-existence among the distinct and 
previously hostile groups. In the case of Sierra Leone, however, the conflict was not 
essentially concerned with inter-communal hostility. What therefore is essential for 
reconciliation in South Africa, Burundi or Rwanda does not necessarily apply to 
Sierra Leone in the same way.   
the national level, and at the communal and personal responses at the local level. 
Neither can be left out in an assessment of the degree to which the conflict can be said 
to be over. 
    The article will proceed, therefore, to take the three markers of youth alienation, 
government corruption and reconciliation to reach some conclusions as to the degree 
to which the underlying factors predisposing Sierra Leone to internal conflict have 
been addressed, peace is being established in the communities and the reconstruction 
project is sustainable.   
 
 
THE ISSUE OF YOUTH ALIENATION 
 
Since 50 per cent of population of Sierra Leone are under 15, any estimation of the 
degree to which the conflict is over and there has been genuine societal change has to 
include them. These are tomorrow’s parents, business owners and agricultural 
workers or tomorrow’s fighters. The problems they face are enormous: problems of 
unemployment, missed and currently inadequate education, the loss of one or both 
parent, and for at least 10,000, the trauma of having been directly involved with the 
fighting forces in the war as combatants or sex slaves. Since May 2001, 7,000 former 
child soldiers have been demobilised, 98 per cent of whom have now been reunified 
with their families and communities. However, an unknown number of women and 
girls still remain with their RUF rebel ‘husbands’.22
 
 As the government 
acknowledges: 
Disenfranchisement of youth was one of the primary factors that led to the 
war, creating resentment and a sense of hopelessness in the first place, and 
ensuring the existence of a willing pool of recruits for the fighting factions. 
During the war, youth have been exposed to more trauma, responsibility and 
experience of power than ever before. As a result, they are now more 
politically aware and carry greater expectations for involvement in decision-
making and desire for economic opportunity than ever before.23
 
  
Yet despite these high expectations and despite all the efforts to improve education 
and welfare services, many young people still do not have access to them or must 
learn in classrooms in need of repair, re-equipment and more teachers and materials 
The same disappointment faces the former child soldiers who were promised at the 
peace settlement condensed primary school courses or vocational courses. One recent 
observer noted that: 
 
The education system in the Kambia District is gradually collapsing. Most of 
the schools destroyed by the fighting forces have not been rehabilitated and 
the few usable ones have very few teachers most of whom get to school once 
in a blue moon because of non-payment of salaries. Hand counts in schools 
revealed the following: Kamba, 454 pupils, 3 teachers; Rokupr (form 3) 615 
pupils, 3 teachers; Kamranka, 202 pupils, 2 teachers; Senthai, 524 pupils, 4 
teachers. What is more disheartening is that parents are now taxed by school 
authorities to pay salaries of additional teachers in their schools … Some of 
the parents have started removing their children from school … Some boys 
and girls who do not have parents to take care of them are in fact becoming 
street kids, street walking kids and prostitutes.24  
 
Nor are their employment prospects encouraging. Many older ones have been forced 
to turn to hawking, prostitution, begging and crime on the streets and see little 
prospect of better jobs or the possibility of being able to finance further education or 
training. In Kono district, in the east, thousands between 7 and 16 years have turned to 
diamond mining in conditions that are extremely exploitative. They are often enticed 
with gifts of trainers and tape recorders and then given non-negotiable fees on an 
irregular basis.25 The child miners come from various backgrounds, from ex-
combatants and street children, to abandoned and separated children.  In Koidu town, 
15 year old Ibrahim Kaisamba, an ex-combatant, reported: ‘I am not happy being in 
the mines. If I had an option, I would be in school by now … I still feel too bad about 
my experience as a combatant and do hope my life changes drastically.’ 14-year-old 
Foday Kanu lost both his parents in the war. He served as a commander of the ‘Small 
Boys Unit’ of the RUF. In his words, ‘The people who now look after me just can't 
afford to pay my school fees because they are poor and have been impoverished by 
the civil war’.26
    Sadly the culture of expectation in terms of education and employment has not 
been dampened by the government. On the contrary, the government has made 
promises to the youth concerning employment and education that it knows it cannot 
fulfil. Recently the National Commission for War-Affected Children has been set up 
with the objective that concerns of war-affected children will be translated into policy, 
priority setting and resource allocation. Yet as regards the Ministry of Youth its 
impact so far has been disappointing. Its National Youth Policy, launched in July 
2003, has been accused by the National Youth Coalition and young people generally, 
of being drawn up without adequate consultation with them and of ignoring issues of 
information technology training and of psychological help.
 The lack of full government control in the east makes it unlikely that 
it can in the short term regularise the mining sector and get young people away from 
the mine sites. Nor has it the resources to create employment in the main towns, 
whilst foreign direct investment is still hesitant to risk capital in such a fragile nation 
with so little infrastructure. But while jobs fail to materialise, unemployed or 
exploited children are vulnerable and are a ready source of recruitment for potential 
troublemakers. They are those most likely to resort to violence and anti-social 
behaviour if their condition is neglected. 
27 In the absence of serious 
provision by the state, a vigorous network of civil society organisations works on their 
behalf. It includes the radio station ‘The Voice of the Children’, that claims it is run 
by and for children. More remarkable than these external initiatives has been the 
ability that youth themselves have shown in organising themselves. In the face of the 
absence of state provision and the collapse of the armed groups that previously 
offered some identity and support, the youth have organised youth groups throughout 
the country, though the term ‘youth group’ is used fairly loosely. There are 10 major 
youth groups that have a high percentage of ex-combatants, including MOCKY 
(Movement of Concerned Kono Youths, which has an estimated 5,000 members) and 
Kono District Youth League.28
    On the positive side, the youth groups not only offer a measure of assistance to 
young people, but their very strength away from Freetown can be seen as a pressure 
for governance decentralisation. On the negative side, many of the groups are still 
dominated by an elite class of privileged young people or are manipulated by local 
‘strongmen’ (politicians and entrepreneurs) for their own ends. As a result, the role of 
some of the groups is somewhat ambiguous, ranging from support for youths to trade 
protectionism. The government and UNAMSIL is finding it now needs their co-
   
operation as much as the paramount chiefs in some areas.29 For instance, in the 
diamond mining area of Kono some report that it is the youth groups who decide 
which company sets up in the diamond fields. This may explain why the government 
is surprisingly ambivalent about them. On the one hand it recognises that in areas 
where the state is thin on the ground, particularly in terms of security forces, these 
groups offer some form of policing organisation that can be harnessed for good. On 
the other hand, the government must surely recognise their dangerous potential. For 
instance, in December 2001 a dispute over mining in Kono district led to serious 
clashes between former RUF rebels and youths from MOCKY. During the clashes the 
youths, supported by policemen and former Civil Defence Force (CDF) militiamen, 
and allegedly backed by local chiefs and leaders, attacked former RUF combatants 
and their families. The clashes left at least thirteen, mostly former RUF combatants, 
dead. During the fighting thousands of civilians, including hundreds of former RUF 
fighters, fled the area. There were periodic reports of MOCKY members using 
intimidation to evict non Konos from towns within Kono district in what appeared to 
be an attempt to consolidate ethnic Kono control over the diamond-mining area.30 As 
part of MOCKY’s campaign to evict all foreigners, in 2002 they abducted a Lebanese 
trader, holding him hostage until a ransom of US$1,700 was paid. There is, then, a 
very real danger that youth groups will obstruct or resist the will of the government 
and resort to violence, whether it be of a criminal or of a militia nature. At least 5 
youth groups have been identified as having the potential to be dangerous and to 
constitute a destabilising influence, especially those that have replaced the collapsed 
RUF in its former strongholds.31
    It should come as no surprise that in the aftermath of the war armed youth groups 
are seeking an alternative place of belonging and social cohesion within the criminal 
youth gangs. The gang offers a cohesive alternative sub-culture to the dominant 
culture which has marginalised them, boasts its own uniform, its own language and, 
through criminal activity, offers alternative forms of wealth creation. The conditions 
for ongoing conflict are still very much present. They will continue to play themselves 
out within families, communities, schools and with traditional authorities. The 
productive participation of youth, on the other hand, requires constructive social 
incentives: cohesive communities, accessible education and recognition of the rights 
of youth to participate in the peace process. The fear is that the transition from the 
politics of confrontation to the politics of negotiation may not mark the end of 
violence - but only a subtle slide from political to criminal violence as a direct 
response to the unaddressed issue of marginalisation. 
   
 
 
THE ISSUE OF CORRUPTION 
 
The Sierra Leonean proverbs say that you cannot feed a child and not lick your hand 
or that you must not smell the mouth of the one who pounds your benni seed. For 
many, what westerners call ‘corruption’ is a necessary survival strategy. Hence those 
working with the Anti-Corruption Commission’s education programme report that,  
 
people tell us clearly that the fight will be an uphill task with the present 
conditions of service for workers. Corruption is being justified by a large 
percentage of wage earners, on the proviso that their salaries are a pittance 
compared to the cost of living’.32
 
  
When it comes to the conduct of their political leaders, however, Sierra Leoneans 
expect arrests and jail. Yet for all the promises of their leaders, the pressure from 
donors and the creation of institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, 
corruption remains at the heart of government and deeply embedded in the 
bureaucracy and criminal justice system. So say senior police concerning politicians 
and other police officers, and politicians concerning the police and other politicians; 
and so say NGOs and donors about both.33 The charges even extend to UNAMSIL 
and the Anti-Corruption Commission itself.34 The accusations of corruption are of 
course only anecdotal, but the perception is nevertheless widespread that little has 
changed since ‘democracy’ came.35 In other words, the sense of injustice that 
recruited so many people to the RUF - that the then APC (All People’s Congress 
party) government was thoroughly corrupt - has not dissipated now that the Sierra 
Leone People's Party's (SLPP) government is elected and the constitution a multi-
party one. For all the public commissions of the 1990s into state corruption, little has 
changed. Neither has corruption changed in the clientelist systems that intertwine 
society at large.36
    Clare Short, who until recently was Secretary of State for Development in the 
British Government, is quite explicit, that alongside Charles Taylor, corruption 
constitutes one of the greatest threats to Sierra Leone: 
  
 
Corruption, either grand (the looting of state coffers by those in public trust, 
the illegal trading in diamonds) or petty (the charge demanded by a low-
ranking official for a service that should be free), remains endemic in Sierra 
Leone. It has become a way of life for many. Society has come to accept, even 
expect, corruption. As always the poor suffer most, and the poorest of the poor 
most of all. They are denied access to education, healthcare and medicine 
because they cannot afford to make the extra payments demanded by corrupt 
officials. They are denied justice when the legal system is twisted by bribery. 
And they suffer when corruption diverts scarce resources away from 
development or deters essential domestic and international investment. The 
system for prosecuting those found out is itself corrupted by inertia, and the 
failure to punish those responsible. The temptation therefore remains. Too 
many of the people entering politics and the civil service in Sierra Leone do so 
in order to make money. Personal gain, or loyalty to family, tribe or party, is 
put before national interest. And the consequence of this is that the country is 
damaged and everyone loses out.37
 
  
A great deal of donor money has gone into introducing a number of mechanisms to 
ensure greater accountability for how public money is spent and tighter accountancy 
systems have been put in place within the Ministry of Finance. However, although, 
‘accounting systems for salaries and budgets have reduced the number of “ghost” 
employees and decreased the opportunities for padding budgets and siphoning funds 
…[nevertheless] government officials continue to try to skim off the top of 
[development] projects’.38 One donor official admitted that reforms instituted during 
2001/2 were a ‘façade’ because of the perpetual tendency of individual politicians and 
high level civil servants to continually undermine the structures and mechanisms that 
have been set up to improve transparency and accountability.39 Donor-funded 
initiatives have included the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC), the Governance 
Reform Secretariat, the Law Development programme and the published Public 
Expenditure Tracking Surveys. Then there was a corruption survey in 2000 (to be 
extended and followed up in 2003) to collect information about the experience and 
perceptions of corruption by citizens of Sierra Leone, thus establishing a baseline for 
future monitoring of change. There have also been some anti-corruption reforms in 
the police and the military and some media development work to encourage 
investigative reporting.  
    Yet all these efforts are still insufficient in and of themselves to tackle the scale of 
the problem. They are largely institutional measures that require a commitment to 
implementation that cannot always be assumed. Further, the initiatives are 
uncoordinated. The country needs a single coherent action programme to reduce 
corruption and to strengthen financial management and accountability within 
government (the national anti-corruption strategy that the government agreed to 
initiate with the Commission in 2000 has largely been left unimplemented). Adequate 
management systems are required in the civil service, to ensure transparent public 
procurement and to discourage corruption. Audits are still rare within the government 
departments, government agencies and quasi-governmental organisations such as the 
University and state owned enterprises. Many have not been audited for decades. 
Again, the management of the country’s diamond resources still allows a major 
diversion of the country’s resources into private hands. This major area of corruption 
is likely to continue whilst there is only minimal control of mining and security is 
inadequate. With this general lack of government control and information on 
government expenditures, it is difficult to hold the government to account. Further, 
the local press lacks the capacity to investigate and expose corrupt practices in 
government. Even when information is available, there are few organisations that can 
effectively use it to engage with government.  
    Some of the problems of a top-down institutional approach to tackling corruption 
are highlighted by the functioning of the Anti-Corruption Commission. It was 
established in 2000 under pressure from Britain with extensive powers of search and 
arrest. It not only receives and processes complaints from the public, but is said to 
have ‘collected clear evidence of deep corruption among civil servants and ministers. 
Working with British intelligence, it has tracked down bank accounts and secret 
correspondence and gathered information that before would have been well hidden’.40 
However, with institutionalised patterns of behaviour among the political class little 
changed, the effects of the discoveries were not surprising. Thus although the 
Commission found the transport minister with an illegal packet of diamonds worth 
about £25,000, it appears that ‘President Kabbah personally pressured the 
Commission to drop the case … At a cabinet meeting in April 2002, ministers 
claimed that the Anti-Corruption Commission was embarrassing the government and 
proposed that a more sympathetic lawyer be appointed to handle all prosecutions’.41 
Furthermore, Kabbah’s ‘political appointees in the Commission are believed to be 
tipping off key people in government so that when the ACC team raids the office or 
an account, it finds the evidence removed’.42 Since all suspects have to be handed 
over to the attorney general, who is also Minister of Justice, there is a further 
opportunity for the government to see that cases proceed through the judicial process 
slowly or not at all (though this was strongly denied by the Minister in an 
interview).43
    The Anti-Corruption Commission’s 2002 report only confirmed its ineffectiveness: 
no cases brought to trial during 2002, little movement on cases pending in 2001, and 
even fewer additions. The Anti-Corruption Commissioner Val Collier said that 
because the Anti-Corruption Act (2000) provided no penalties for failing to cooperate 
with the Commission, many government ministries and departments simply ignored 
  
the Commission or refused to comply with its requests and recommendations. Collier 
also expressed frustration over what he said was ‘the rather lukewarm attitude of the 
judiciary, which after two years has yet to take a single matter of adjudication to a 
final conclusion,’ and ‘a level of disinterestedness’ by Parliament. He claimed that it 
was inevitable, given inadequate legal staff levels, that cases turned over by the 
Commission had not been prosecuted.44 Nor do the problems end with the 
Commission. Against the background of suspected political interference in the 
judicial process, there is the manifest inability or unwillingness of the Public 
Accounts Committee and other Parliamentary Committees to exercise their authority 
and to show independence of the government. The concern must be that the political 
class has little serious interest in tackling corruption from above. Clare Short may 
well be right: ‘Sierra Leone has got to clean up its act fast if it is to remain at peace’.45
 
  
 
THE ISSUE OF RECONCILIATION 
 
More than cessation of fighting is required to finish a war where the combatants of 
both sides live in close proximity. The task is more than reconstructing economies and 
creating wealth and employment. It is also more than reintroducing free elections for 
political office, establishing constitutional rights for the citizens and the 
"normalisation" of government-to-government relations. As Graeme Simpson 
observes, violent conflict goes beyond the disruption of economics and politics - it 
damages society: 
 
It causes massive social dislocation, and taints or destroys social relations - 
from national political relationships to very basic human interactions - whether 
through racism, violence against women, or destruction of families … But so 
much international aid for the recovery or reconstruction process seems almost 
blind to this social dislocation and to the vital and basic need to rebuild social 
relationships.
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Recognising this, both the national government and the international aid community 
put considerable emphasis on what they call ‘reconciliation programmes’. These are 
fairly narrowly defined, that is, instead of seeking friendship between former enemies, 
as is implied by the word reconciliation, they settle for programmes aimed at 
achieving a renunciation of violence and requiring a willingness by the protagonists to 
work together for national development (for instance, the Red Cross programmes 
called Community Animation and Peace Support). Their first attempts, undertaken at 
the Lome peace agreement of 1999, were even more constrained. Despite the RUF’s 
track record of broken peace agreements (1996), backing a military coup (1997) and 
uniting with the ousted coup leaders to launch another nearly successful attack on 
Freetown, they offered a power-sharing arrangement and the dubious concession of 
amnesty to fighters. In addition, even though the RUF leader Foday Sankoh had been 
condemned to death for treason in 1998, he was given a full pardon, reinstated as a 
Sierra Leonean citizen, and offered vice-presidential status plus the chairmanship of 
the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources (in effect, the Minister of 
diamonds!). In the name of ‘national unity’ the untrustworthy were trusted 
unconditionally. Not surprisingly this government fell apart as the RUF returned to 
insurgency. When that phase of the war came to an end, following the action of 
ECOMOG (The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group), 
UNAMSIL and British troops in 2000, the RUF was not given a second chance of a 
seat in power. Instead, reconciliation was primarily invested in two formal 
institutions: The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC).47
    The intentions of those who pressed for these institutions are not doubted. They 
believed that there is no peace without justice,
 Together these transitional justice mechanisms assumed at the 
national level the symbolic role of writing the history of the conflict and prosecuting 
the leading actors behind the atrocities.  
48 and hoped that some form of 
catharsis would follow from the historical narrative and prosecutions. On hindsight, 
however, the remit and constitutions of the institutions may prove to be ill conceived. 
Firstly, they will inevitably leave most of the abuses unpunished: the remit is very 
narrow (the Court is to prosecute those – some 20-30 - who bear the greatest 
responsibility for the atrocities of the war and that only from November 1996); whilst 
the time span is brief (the Court has a 3 year mandate, the TRC a 12-18 month one). 
Indeed some of the prosecution witnesses called before the Special Court are 
inevitably war criminals themselves.49 Secondly, they will leave most of the abuses 
unrecorded by a public fearful of reprisals. Thirdly, the Court lacks the authority to 
compel the apprehension of those indicted by the Court, so that President Charles 
Taylor of Liberia, though indicted in June 2003, cannot be forced to attend. Fourthly, 
the two institutions may prove to be contradictory as persons will be constrained from 
giving evidence to the TRC if there is a danger that they may be prosecuted by the 
Special Court.50 Finally the institutions lack universal support in the country. There is 
evidence that there are distinct regional views about the two institutions: the south 
largely supporting the Special Court, whilst the north largely supports the TRC.51 
Some had feared that the power of the attorney general, who is also the Minister of 
Justice, to defer or discontinue any proceedings at his discretion, would protect key 
political figures in government and smother embarrassing disclosures.52 However, the 
arrest of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Sam Hinga Norman, the Kamajors self-
styled paramount chief and leading figure in the CDF, on 9 March, (along with the 
indictment for crimes committed against humanity of: Foday Sankoh, ex-head of the 
RUF (now deceased); RUF officials Issa Sesay, Alex Brima and Morris Kallon; ex-
rebel commander Sam Bockarie (now deceased) and Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of 
the ruling military junta in 1997-1998) dispelled that fear and showed that the Court 
was not simply aimed at potential political rivals of the government.53 Nevertheless 
the claim by the special prosecutor that the Court has a role in creating a ‘foundation 
of respect for the law through training, outreach and public awareness that can be 
sustained after the court has completed its work’54
    These two formal and Freetown based institutions exemplify the problems of trying 
to find a legal framework for a process such as reconciliation, which is essentially 
something that must take place at the individual and psychological level. The key area 
for reconciliation is the local one where neighbours have to live with ex-combatants 
or perhaps even with those who are known to have committed atrocities against 
family and kin. At this level certain processes have to take place for there to be any 
meaningful reconciliation. At the very least it requires former protagonists to engage 
 seems exaggerated, given that only 
20 or so cases are expected to be processed. As for the TRC’s remit not only to create 
‘an impartial, historical record of the conflict’, but to ‘address impunity; respond to 
the needs of victims; promote healing and reconciliation; and prevent a repetition of 
the violations and abuses suffered’, this too looks over-ambitious given its lack of 
funding and poor organisation. The reality is that both these institutions have more to 
do with meeting the donor agenda than the calls of the general public.  
with one another. Further, whatever comes out at the TRC, at the local level, the 
misdeeds need to be owned up to and publicly acknowledged for what they are. The 
alternative is that the truth will seep out drop by drop over the years, poisoning efforts 
to move on. Collective amnesia is often reported following conflict,55 but silence is 
not the same as reconciliation. In addition to words and as a practical way of adding 
flesh to apologies, reconciliation is enhanced by the offer of some form of restitution, 
such as helping to rebuild community property or services. No one can require of 
another full forgiveness, although this is the ultimate demonstration of reconciliation. 
Whatever the degree of reconciliation it is costly at the local level and what is more, is 
beyond governments and national symbolic acts to achieve. It is to be hoped that local 
organisations and associations can facilitate it, but ultimately it has to come from a 
will to do it among the individuals, victims and perpetrators.56 Penfold argues that 
many who ‘undoubtedly feel that there should be some accounting for these terrible 
tragedies’, nevertheless are prepared to refrain from personal revenge and to leave it 
to God or Allah to determine retribution.57
    In Sierra Leone there have been numerous initiatives to facilitate reconciliation at 
the local level by bringing together former antagonists in joint work programmes, 
sports competitions, peace and reconciliation concerts and community sensitising 
meetings. If they are successful then development has a solid societal foundation. But 
if communities are divided, harbour hatred and engage in ostracism and revenge 
attacks, then it is very difficult to see how permanent reconstruction can be achieved. 
Ex-combatants with no employment opportunities, with no community willing to 
receive them and anxious about their own indictment (and that of their leaders), may 
well gravitate to their own groups for support and proceed to sustain themselves in the 
way they know best – by violence. Reconstructing societies requires understanding 
the dynamic and close relationship between social, political and economic interests. 
Economic infrastructure can be rebuilt, but political upheaval will destroy it again 
overnight. Social fabric can be rebuilt and political settlements negotiated, but unless 
the people's economic needs are met, those agreements have no credibility. 
  
    So what has happened to the 24,000 RUF fighters and 37,000 CDF who have 
handed in their weapons? The pattern, as reported by field officers working with 
NGOs and donor agencies, is very mixed. There are very different scenarios in 
different areas. In places the ex-combatants have returned to their homes and have 
been accepted, elsewhere they have tried and been rebuffed or been subject to attacks, 
in still other cases they have either been too frightened to return or have permanently 
settled in new areas. Thus the Registrar of the Special Court reports that their officials 
are finding as they travel the country, that ‘in some areas, perpetrators have already 
been reintegrated. Elsewhere perpetrators are being attacked by groups who are taking 
the law into their own hands’.58
    The mixed responses are confirmed by field officers of the Campaign for Good 
Governance (CGG). One wrote in 2002 of the Kambia district, on the northern border 
with Guinea: 
  
 
The peace and reconciliation expected to be achieved is far from getting its 
required fruits in Kambia district [because] people most affected by the war 
living in the villages are not sensitised on what peace and reconciliation is all 
about. The assignments of sensitising people are given to people who could 
not even speak the languages understood by the common people … people 
worst hit by the war, for example amputees, have been completely abandoned 
… Some of these amputees are forced by hunger to go out begging. Would 
peace and reconciliation be understood by these people?59
  
  
The same officer wrote in February 2003: ‘The relationship between ex-combatants 
and other civilians is not healthy at all. Civilians, especially victims of the past war 
still keep ex-combatants at arms length because of the problems they caused their 
lives’.60
    Yet in the Tonkolili district, DFID’s community reintegration programme reported 
a more positive picture for the period October-November, 2002: 
  
 
The identity of ex-combatants is gradually being lost due to the influx of 
returnees to the district. The process of natural reintegration is taking place 
and it is becoming very difficult to distinguish between an ex-combatant and 
an OWAP [other war-affected persons] or any other category of citizen. In fact 
a lot of ex-combatants do not like being called by that name. Many 
communities are now facing reality and accepting ex-combatants. The only 
slight hitch is for ex-combatants who come from some other regions of the 
country, the Tonkolili communities are still not accepting them and still 
believe that they should be settled in their regions of origin.61
 
  
Even within districts the situation can be varied over place and time. In Port Loko, 
both Amnesty International local members and the CGG field officer spoke of 
reconciliation not being an issue, for there were ‘cordial relationships’ with 
returnees, whilst ex-combatants, even though many were from the south east and ‘too 
frightened to return’, had been ‘reintegrated’ through training.62
 
 Nevertheless, the 
DFID account records two football matches at secondary schools in Port Loko and 
Lunsar which ended with ex-combatants resorting to violence and burning down 2 
houses: 
Investigation has revealed that the majority of the students from the secondary 
school that instigated the fighting are ex-combatants (XCs), around 400 in 
total. A number of factors have contributed to their disruptive behaviour. One 
is that NCDDR [National Commission for Demobilisation and Disarmament 
and Reintegration] have delayed with payments of students’ allowances, 
contributing to their frustrations. Another is the apparent lack of discipline and 
respect that students have for teachers in that particular school. Some of these 
XCs had attended the Catholic school [where the violence took place] but due 
to disruptive behaviour they were expelled and, against local advice the other 
secondary school accepted them onto their register.63
 
  
The accounts of revenge attacks are understandably under-reported, but there are 
many who confirm that they occur.
    Also hindering reconciliation is the manner in which the disarmament package (6 
months training, a small monthly stipend and a leaving toolkit) for ex-combatants is 
being handled. Firstly, this is widely perceived as perverse since it ‘rewards’ the 
perpetrators of violence whilst the victims or those who remained loyal to the 
government receive no parallel benefits. Secondly, there have been complaints that 
former RUF combatants have been given preferential treatment over those of the 
CDF.
64    
65 Thirdly, there is even doubt about whether the programme will receive 
sufficient funding to complete its work.66 Certainly the programme has been slow to 
take on many ex-combatants (in June 2003 there were still 9,100 waiting to benefit 
from reintegration projects) and to distribute the toolkits promised to those who have 
completed the programme.67 What the tension over the programme highlights is the 
need for the reconciliation process to be less combatant focussed and more 
community focussed.68
 
  
 
CONTINUING UNCERTAINTIES IN THE RECONSTRUCTION PROCESS 
 
The indicators that have been used in this article suggest that the aid programme 
currently being implemented is not effectively addressing the underlying factors 
predisposing Sierra Leone to internal conflict. Nor is there convincing evidence that a 
level of peace on which to rebuild social and economic has been secured. The work 
undertaken in demobilisation, disarmament and infrastructure building is not to be 
dismissed, but the reconstruction ‘edifice’ that rises daily in Sierra Leone has shaky 
foundations.   
    In the light of this a number of areas in the reconstruction project might be 
reconsidered. Firstly, there is uncertainty about whether it has misread the current 
‘peace’ and whether it maybe a mistake to assume that Sierra Leone is a post-conflict 
society. The cessation of hostilities, the peace agreement, and the rebuilt infrastructure 
do not prove that conflict has ceased. Even if the armed militias had fully disbanded, 
which they have not, there is always the danger in fractured societies that conflict and 
violence, far from disappearing, will, like a rhizome, only grow sideways to re-
emerge elsewhere, perhaps as criminal violence, which anyway was often part of the 
modus operandi of armed rebel groups. In Sierra Leone, as so often happens 
immediately following hostilities, arms are readily obtained and the state police are 
still being reorganized and deployed nationwide, leaving an opportunity for banditry 
and violent crime. This was a feature of Mozambique after the civil war. As 
demobilised fighters ran out of de-mobilisation pay, many reverted to reliance on their 
weapon skills and armed robbery and carjacking rose steeply after the war.69 Indeed 
there are already reports in Sierra Leone of an upsurge in armed robbery on a virtually 
nightly basis in Freetown70 and the US State Department reports that, ‘Armed 
robberies and burglaries of residences have occurred more frequently since the lifting 
of the curfew in early 2002’.71 Beyond the continuation of violence through crime 
there is also the harsh reality that brutal conflicts of the sort witnessed in Sierra Leone 
do not die without trace at the command of formal political or diplomatic settlements 
and peace agreements. They cannot, as Simpson puts it, be ‘negotiated out of 
existence’. They generate their own histories and residual memories, which in turn 
can initiate new violent conflicts. The dreadful possibility is that today's victim can 
become tomorrow's perpetrator as was the case with the Boers and the Hutu. Whether 
manifested in generational patterns of cyclical violence, or more constrained loops of 
revenge and retribution, they can, over time, take on a structural character.72
    A second uncertainty with the reconstruction process is whether it has misconstrued 
the confines of the conflict and hence underestimated the scale of the task. The 
prevalent discourse is one where there is a narrow definition of the victims of the 
conflict, which in turn leads to a focus only on the direct perpetrators of the conflict. 
Combined, these two foci restrict the scope of efforts to promote reconciliation. In 
fact the victims are not just the mutilated, the raped and the displaced, nor were the 
only perpetrators the armed combatants. There were many who suffered indirectly as 
a result of the war (in the loss of business, health, social networks, schooling, savings, 
   
important documentation). Further, there were many indirect beneficiaries of the 
conflict who never picked up a semi-automatic weapon (local ‘strongmen’, looters, 
black marketeers, criminal gangs, hoarders of basic necessities, exploiters of people 
desperate to sell their labour, money lenders – many of whom have retained their 
wartime gains). This wider circle is largely overlooked in the truth telling before the 
TRC and the Special Court, or in the work programmes, sports competitions and 
concerts that bring together former antagonists.73
     The third area of uncertainty concerns the danger of underestimating the 
complexity of bringing about reconciliation. It is salutary to remember Galtung’s 
observation that ‘nobody really knows how to successfully achieve reconciliation’.
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Indeed there is a remarkable paucity of literature on the subject of operationalising it. 
In part this absence is because reconciliation is not just an outcome but a process that 
revolves around relationships rather than issues or interests. In addition there are 
many levels of the reconciled relationship. At its fullest it involves at least five levels: 
accepting responsibility; publicly expressing regret; renunciation of the unacceptable 
behaviour; restitution for wrongs committed; and a mutual commitment not to raise 
the matter again. The centrality of relationship to reconciliation, as opposed to other 
conflict handling mechanisms such as peacekeeping does, however, point to the 
importance of a high level of participation by the conflicting parties in solving the 
problems in the way that is most relevant to their own particular situation. As 
Anderson reminds us, ‘Each war is unique; each society has its own history, culture 
personages, values and tensions’.75 Lederach’s model of reconciliation stressing its 
four elements of truth, mercy, justice and peace (1999:51-3) is widely quoted.76 Yet it 
is an important insight by Cutter that the weight given to each element needs to vary 
from conflict to conflict. In Sierra Leone, where there is a widespread sense of shared 
responsibility for the conflict, forgiveness is to the fore, whereas in Cambodia talk of 
forgiveness is often dismissed (‘How can anyone forgive what happened to us’) and 
in Rwanda the Tutsi can talk of little else than justice and the Hutu of little else but 
democracy.77 Generic approaches promoted by outside professionals are, then, 
unlikely to succeed.78 If reconciliation is more participatory than other conflict 
handling mechanisms, concerns relationships and has a unique context, then it follows 
that methods adopted for achieving it must come from the people themselves.79 
Lederach advocates a model of conflict resolution ‘based on building from cultural 
resources in a given setting’ as opposed to a prescriptive model ‘based on transferring 
conflict resolution technology from one setting to another’.80
    The fourth area of uncertainty concerning the reconstruction process is whether it 
can be underwritten by economic growth. The government strategy boldly asserts 
that: ‘A growing economy will increase revenue to the state, which in turn will 
increase services to the people providing greater opportunities for more sustainable 
livelihoods’.
 One thing is certain that 
to turn relationships from ones or resentment and hostility to friendship and harmony 
needs time and this may not suit the schedules of donor projects  
81 Unfortunately this is more rhetoric than reality since government 
revenue from diamonds is still minimal, there is little manufacturing, few exports and 
approximately 60 per cent of the Government's budget comes from foreign assistance. 
This is hardly an economy geared for success in the global markets. Even if economic 
growth were to be significant, it would not necessarily be universally beneficial for, as 
Eboe Hutchful warns, there are hazards. Economic growth and wealth generation, 
because of the manner in which they inject development resources into impoverished 
communities, and create winners and losers, may actually reinforce conflict.82 Yet it 
will be extremely hard to ensure that growth is even between regions and that it does 
not widen the gap between the rich and the poor, as South Africa has demonstrated. 
    Fifthly there is uncertainty as to whether the peace settlement might not, ironically, 
undermine the rule of law. Everyone is delighted that, at least officially, all the land is 
declared to be safe for settlement. But security is not simply the clearance of rebels, 
but the assurance in the future of protection of life and property. It is about the rule of 
law; about the communal principle of self-restraint within the confines of human 
rights’ respecting law. In this respect there must be anxiety that a political settlement 
that has secured the impunity of the vast majority of the perpetrators of war crimes, 
and of the beneficiaries of conflict exploitation, might in the long term have serious 
negative consequences. It may also confirm popular suspicion that the criminal justice 
system is subject to political interference.  A culture of impunity cannot exist 
alongside a culture of human rights. It is difficult to expect a common criminal to 
respect the law, if the rebel gets away with rape, mutilation or murder.  In particular, 
for the victims of these abuses it means they are denied access to the information that 
could be essential to their rehabilitation, let alone any prospect of redress at civil or 
criminal law. It is not inconceivable therefore that in the absence of any public 
acknowledgment of wrongdoing, coupled to the impossibility of restitution through 
the courts, widespread resentment could well manifest itself in informal retribution at 
both an individual and a collective level.   
    Finally there is the fear that elements in the government and international 
community are looking for speedy repairs to the economy and polity, to ‘fix’ the 
broken state. One understands the political need for the Sierra Leone government and 
donors like Britain to ‘talk up’ the success of the reconstruction programme, but both 
President Kabbah and Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary, speak of 
reconstruction in terms of a narrow definition of non-conflict and improved economic 
infrastructure. Following a meeting with President Kabbah in July 2003, Straw said: 
 
The country has enjoyed well over a year of peace, and work to consolidate 
that peace is well advanced. Sierra Leone has demonstrated that, with the right 
commitment, peace can be attained even in the bleakest of situations… On 14 
July the UN Security Council agreed that the UN peacekeeping force, 
UNAMSIL, should plan for draw-down to be complete by December 2004. 
The UK supports this timetable….
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President Kabbah, on the launching of 
National Social Action Project (successor to 
the National Commission for Social Action 
and its predecessor, the National Commission 
for Reconstruction, Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation), September 2003 claimed that: 
 
[All three agencies] have undertaken 
projects geared towards a rapid 
transition from post-war relief to 
economic growth and sustainable 
development, leading to substantial poverty reduction. These projects … cover 
key sub-sectors, reflecting the priority areas of intervention identified in our 
National Recovery Strategy, namely: Agriculture, Health, Education, 
Community Infrastructure, Micro-finance Enterprise Promotion, Resettlement 
and Rehabilitation, Shelter and Information and Sensitisation… We shall not 
only rehabilitate and refurbish, but we shall also, where appropriate, rebuild 
every single structure and every institution in this country that has been 
damaged by the rebel war by accident or by sheer human neglect.84
 
  
Such restricted terms to describe reconstruction imply that the process is well on its 
way. The discourse seems designed to give an opportunity for a ‘mission (virtually) 
accomplished’ in the not too distant future. When the peace has lasted a few more 
years and the welfare facilities and houses have been rebuilt, then donors will be able 
to scale down aid graciously and the Sierra Leone government will be able to ask for a 
renewed mandate. However, defined in terms of the youth alienation, state corruption 
and limited reconciliation that this paper has drawn attention to, there is very much 
more to rebuilding the nation or to guaranteeing its future security. 
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